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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 06-3783

RAGHAVAN SATHIANATHAN,
Appellant
v.
PACIFIC EXCHANGE, INC.; KATHRYN BECK;
BETSY JAMES; ATTHEW MENNES

On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civ. No. 05-cv-01592)
District Judge: Honorable William G. Bassler

Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 6, 2007
Before: BARRY, CHAGARES and ROTH, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion filed: September 14, 2007)

OPINION

PER CURIAM

Raghavan Sathianathan, acting pro se, appeals the dismissal of his complaint and
the denial of his motion for reconsideration by the United States District United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey.
Sathianathan was the losing party in an arbitration in California sponsored by
defendant Pacific Exchange, Inc. (“PCX”). After unsuccessfully challenging the
arbitration award in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, see N.D. Cal. Civ. No. 04-cv-2130, Sathianathan filed the instant action
against PCX; its general counsel, Kathryn Beck; former general counsel, Betsy James;
and director of arbitration, Matthew Mennes. Although the claims raised in his
voluminous submissions to the District Court and to this Court are not entirely clear,
Sathianathan appears to allege that defendants caused him injury by: suspending
arbitration proceedings for three months in 2003; serving a corrected copy of the
arbitration award after their jurisdiction had expired; and attempting to collect $20,000 in
arbitrator fees. See Appellant’s Reply Brief in Support of Appeal at 4-6. The District
Court dismissed Sathianathan’s complaint on the grounds of arbitral immunity, absence
of a private right of action for damages arising from the failure of PCX to regulate
member organizations, and lack of personal jurisdiction over the individual defendants.
We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, engaging in plenary review
of legal issues of arbitral immunity and personal jurisdiction. See Yarris v. County of
Del., 465 F.3d 129, 134 (3d Cir. 2006); IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254,
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258 (3d Cir. 1998). We review the District Court’s denial of reconsideration for abuse of
discretion. See Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2004).
For a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, that defendant must
have sufficient “minimum contacts” with the forum state, such that subjecting the
defendant to the court’s jurisdiction “comports with traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.” See Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 451 (3d Cir.
2003)(citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985); Int’l Shoe Co.
v. State of Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). When defendants move to dismiss for lack
of personal jurisdiction, plaintiff must establish at least a prima facie case for personal
jurisdiction, with all of plaintiff’s allegations taken as true and all factual disputes
resolved in her favor. See Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Smith, 384 F.3d 93, 97 (3d Cir.
2004).
We agree with the District Court that the plaintiff did not allege facts sufficient to
establish personal jurisdiction over the individual defendants in this case. Jurisdiction
over employees of a corporation does not arise automatically from jurisdiction over the
corporation. See Nicholas v. Saul Stone & Co., 224 F.3d 179, 184 (3d Cir. 2000). “Each
defendant's contacts with the forum state must be assessed individually.” Id. (citation
omitted). According to the amended complaint, the individual defendants in this case are
residents of California. See Amended Complaint, Paras. 7-9. There is no allegation that
they have continuous and systematic contact with New Jersey that would support an
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assertion of general jurisdiction over them in that state. See BP Chems. Ltd. v. Formosa
Chem. & Fibre Corp., 229 F.3d 254, 262-63 (3d Cir. 2000). The only contacts the
individual defendants made with the forum state in this case were a handful of telephone
calls, e-mails, and letters apprising appellant, a New Jersey resident, of the status of the
arbitration. Such “minimal communication between the defendant and the plaintiff in the
forum state, without more, will not subject the defendant to the jurisdiction of that state's
court system.” IMO Indus., 155 F.3d at 260 n.3; see also Toys “R” US, 318 F.3d at 45354; BP Chems., 229 F.3d at 261. The individual defendants did not purposefully avail
themselves of the forum state and could not reasonably anticipate being haled into court
there. See BP Chemicals, 229 F.3d at 259-60. As plaintiff failed to make even a
threshold showing of jurisdiction, he was not entitled to the jurisdictional discovery he
claims to have been denied. See Toys “R” US, 318 F.3d at 456.
We agree with the District Court’s conclusion that it had jurisdiction over PCX,
see Amended Complaint, Para. 5, and that all claims against that defendant are barred by
the doctrine of arbitral immunity.1 Such immunity protects arbitrators from “civil liability
for acts within their jurisdiction arising out of their arbitral functions in contractually
agreed upon arbitration hearings.” See Wasyl, Inc. v. First Boston Corp., 813 F.2d 1579,
1582 (9th Cir. 1987); Pfannenstiel v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 477 F.3d

1

We construe the amended complaint liberally, as Sathianathan is proceeding pro se.
Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003). We also note that appellants have
not challenged the District Court’s ruling on this issue.
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1155, 1159 (10th Cir. 2007); Cahn v. Int’l Ladies' Garment Union, 311 F.2d 113, 114-15
(3d Cir. 1962). Arbitral immunity has been logically extended to the boards sponsoring
the arbitration. See Corey v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 691 F.2d 1205, 1209 (6th Cir. 1982).
Sathianathan argues that defendants are not shielded by arbitral immunity. First,
he contends that they acted without jurisdiction in delivering a corrected copy of the
arbitration award form. While there is no dispute that all three arbitrators heard and
decided the case, two of their signatures were missing from the initially distributed award
form. Two months later, this mistake was corrected and a substantively identical form
with all three signatures was distributed. Appellant argues that because the corrected
form was delivered after he had filed his federal court challenge to the arbitration award,
defendants lacked jurisdiction to correct the error on the award form. In adjudicating
Sathianathan’s challenge to the arbitration award, the District Court for the Northern
District of California accepted the corrected form, as defendants were simply rectifying a
clerical error. We will not disturb its decision. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a); Barris v. Bob’s
Drag Chutes & Safety Equip. Inc., 717 F.2d 52, 55 (3d Cir. 1983)(“[A] motion to correct
a clerical mistake does not affect the finality of the original judgment.”); In re U.S.
Healthcare, Inc., 193 F.3d 151, 158 n.2 (3d Cir. 1999)(“[A]ppellate courts ‘have treated
clerical errors, oversights, and omissions as if they had been corrected and have not
required the formality of a correction by the district court.’” (citation omitted)).
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Appellant also suggests that the suspension of arbitration proceedings does not
qualify for arbitral immunity because defendants made a system-wide administrative
decision to suspend all PCX arbitrations during that period, not a case-specific choice to
suspend one particular proceeding.2 Any alleged injury to the appellant, however, resulted
solely from the scheduling of the arbitration to which he was a party. This was a
“decisional act” directly related to the arbitration and protected by arbitral immunity. See
Pfannenstiel, 477 F.3d at 1159. Defendants are similarly immune from appellant’s attempt
to overturn the arbitrators’ assessment of forum fees, which are properly viewed as part of
the arbitration award. See id.
We find no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s denial of Sathianathan’s
motion for reconsideration, which identified neither errors in the District Court’s order nor
any other basis to justify revisiting that order.
Accordingly, we will affirm the order of the District Court.
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According to defendants, PCX-supervised arbitrations were suspended in early 2003
due to concerns about compliance with a new California law.
6

